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Abstract
We revisit command-and-control regulations and compare their eciencies, in par-
ticular, an emission cap regulation that restricts total emissions and an emission inten-
sity regulation that restricts emissions per unit of output under emission equivalence.
We nd that in both the most stringent target case, when the target emission level
is close to zero, and the weakest target case, when the target emission level is close
to business as usual, emission intensity yields greater welfare, although the same may
not be true in moderate target cases.
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1 Introduction
Global warming is one of the most serious risks that society faces, and many countries have
recently voluntary committed to reducing CO2 emissions under the Paris Agreement on cli-
mate change. A standard policy for reducing CO2 emissions is the introduction of so-called
\market-based instruments," such as a carbon tax or an emission tax. A number of theo-
retical studies in environmental economics encourage the use of indirect regulations rather
than command-and-control approaches from the perspective of cost-eectiveness. However,
in practice, command-and-control instruments are now at the center of the regulatory de-
bate for several reasons: political diculty of introducing the optimal tax; provision of a
simple, certain way to achieve a desirable goal; and incomplete enforcement and high mon-
itoring costs for market-based instruments.1 In such a case, direct regulations can play an
important role.
In this study, we compare two direct regulations, an emission cap regulation that re-
stricts total emissions and an emission intensity regulation that restricts emissions per unit
of output, and we examine their eciency. Many studies have shown that dierent policy
instruments have dierent welfare and environmental consequences, because dierent in-
struments provide dierent incentives for rms (Besanko, 1987; Helfand, 1991; Lahiri and
Ono; 2007; Kiyono and Ishikawa, 2013; Amir et al., 2018). For example, Montero (2002)
focused only on rms' incentive under four regulations, including an emission cap and an
emission intensity regulation, and evaluated environmental R&D rankings in a symmetric
duopoly model with general demand. As for social welfare, Lahiri and Ono (2007) compared
an emission intensity regulation and an emission tax under a Cournot oligopoly and showed
the advantage of the emission intensity regulation over the emission tax in the weakest tar-
get case (the target emission level is close to business as usual). Amir et al. (2018) extended
1For a more detailed argument, see B}ohringer et al. (2017), Cohen and Keiser (2017), and Demirel et
al. (2018).
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Montero's (2002) analysis to rank regulatory instruments with respect to social welfare but
provided numerical examples by using simple specication.
Under the oligopolistic market, we show that the emission intensity regulation yields
greater welfare than the emission cap regulation does in the most stringent target case,
in which the target emission level is close to zero (Propositions 2 and 2B). Although the
target level is extreme, the hypothetical target plays a relevant role. For example, under
the Paris climate agreement, many countries, such as the UK, France, Germany, and Japan,
plan to reduce CO2 emissions drastically by 2050 (about 80% reduction at least against
a business-as-usual scenario). To achieve this goal, in several industries, such as electric
power and transportation, authorities may impose an emission constraint that is close to
zero emissions. Thus, the most stringent case we discuss must be important. Japanese
electric power companies have committed to CO2 emissions per kilowatt-hour, not total
emissions, and our result suggests that this could be an ecient commitment. In addition,
we examine the opposite case, in which the emission target is signicantly weak. Again, we
show that the emission intensity regulation improves social welfare more than the emission
cap regulation does (Propositions 3 and 3B). However, we nd that the welfare ranking may
be reversed, meaning that the emission cap regulation may yield greater welfare than the
emission cap regulation under a moderate emission target (Proposition 4).
We also show that under an emission intensity regulation, the stricter regulation may
reduce abatement investment, whereas the stricter regulation always increases abatement
investment under an emission cap regulation. In other words, the relationship between the
degree of regulation and emission abatement activity depends on the regulation measure.
This result suggests that a larger abatement investment might not imply stricter regulation
in the industry.2
2For empirical work on the relationship between abatement investment and environmental performance,
see Gutierrez and Teshima (2018).
3
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 formulates the model of quantity
competition, and Section 3 compares emission intensity regulation and emission cap regu-
lation. Section 4 presents results under price competition as a robustness check. Section 5
concludes.
2 The Model
We consider an industry with n symmetric polluting rms. The rm produces a single
commodity for which the inverse demand function is given by P : R+ 7! R+. We assume
that P (Q) is twice continuously dierentiable and P 0(Q) < 0 for all Q as long as P > 0. Let
C(qi) : R+ 7! R+ be the cost function of each rm, where qi (i = 1; 2:; :::; n) is the output
of rm i (i = 1; 2; :::; n). We suppose C is twice continuously dierentiable, increasing, and
convex for all qi.
3 We assume that the marginal revenue is decreasing in rivals' outputs (i.e.,
P 0(Q)+P 00(Q)qi < 0). These assumptions are standard and guarantee that the second-order
condition is satised.
Emissions are associated with production, which yields a negative externality. After
emissions have been generated, they can be reduced through investment in abatement tech-
nologies.4 Thus, rm i's net emissions are ei := g(qi)   xi, where g : R+ 7! R+ represents
emissions associated with production and xi(2 R+) is rm i's abatement level. We assume
that g is twice continuously dierentiable, increasing, and convex for all qi.
The rm's prot is P (Q)qi C(qi) K(xi), where the third term represents the abatement
cost. We suppose that K is twice continuously dierentiable, increasing, and strictly convex
for xi > 0. We further assume that K(0) = K
0(0) = 0.5 This assumption guarantees that
3We can relax this assumption. Our results hold if C 00   P 0 > 0 for all Q as long as P > 0:
4These are called end-of-pipe technologies. An alternative approach to reduce emissions is to change the
production process. For a recent discussion of the relationship between mandatory regulation and this type
of innovation, see Matsumura and Yamagishi (2017).
5The form of the abatement (R&D) cost function is a standard assumption in industrial organization
and environmental economics (D'Aspremont and Jacquemin, 1998; Amir et al., 2018).
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the social optimal level of abatement is never zero and that the prot function is smooth.
Total social surplus (rms' prots plus consumer surplus minus the loss caused by the
externality) is given by
W (q1; :::; qn) =
nX
i=1
i + CS   (E) =
Z Q
0
P (z)dz  
nX
i=1
(C(qi) +K(xi))  (E);
where  : R+ 7! R+ is the welfare loss of emissions, and E =
Pn
i=1 ei:
We assume that the environmental target E for total emissions is exogenously given
(regulated by the government). E may depend on the administrative cost, political pressure,
or international commitment, and thus, for simplicity, we treat the target as an exogenous
variable. We assume that E 2 (0; EB) where EB is the prot-maximizing emission level
without a binding emission target (business-as-usual level). Let qB be the prot-maximizing
output without a binding emission target. E is attained through an emission intensity or
emission cap.
Because there is no heterogeneity among rms, we focus on the symmetric equilibrium
in which all rms choose the same actions in equilibrium.
3 Analysis
3.1 Emission Intensity Regulation
Let  be the upper bound of the emission per unit of output. Firm i chooses its output, qi,
and abatement level, xi, to maximize its prot subject to
  ei
qi
=
g(qi)  xi
qi
: (1)
When the constraint is binding,6 rm i's optimization problem is
max
qi
P (Q)qi   C(qi) K(g(qi)  qi): (2)
6The constraint is always binding because E < EB .
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Let superscript EI denote the equilibrium outcomes under emission intensity regulation.
Dene EIi (qi; Q i) := P (Q)qi C(qi) K(g(qi) qi). Focusing on the symmetric equilib-
rium, the equilibrium output, qEI(), is characterized by the following rst-order condition:
@EIi
@qi
= P 0(nqEI)qEI + P (nqEI)  C 0(qEI) K 0(xEI)  g0(qEI)   = 0: (3)
The second-order condition is satised. We obtain xEI() = g(qEI())   qEI() and
eEI() = g(qEI())  xEI() = qEI().
Dierentiating (3) yields
dqEI
d
=   @
2EIi =@qi@
@2EIi =@qi
2 +
P
j 6=i @
2EIi =@qi@qj
> 0; (4)
where we use @2EIi =@qi@ = K
0+(g0 )K 00qi > 0 and @2EIi =@qi2+
P
j 6=i @
2EIi =@qi@qj =
P 0   C 00   g00K 0   (g0   )2K 00 + n(P 0 + P 00qi) < 0. An increase in  relaxes the emission
restriction and reduces the marginal cost of production, which increases qEI .
The government sets the emission intensity  =  such that neEI() = E. Let
(qEI( E); xEI( E)) be the pair of equilibrium output and abatement and WEI( E) be the
equilibrium welfare under emission intensity regulation when  = :
3.2 Emission Cap Regulation
Next, we consider the case under an emission cap regulation. Firms are symmetric and the
number of permits is uniformly allocated, E=n. Let superscript EC denote the equilibrium
outcomes under emission cap regulation. Then, the prot function of rm i under the
emission cap regulation is dened by ECi (qi; Q i) := P (Q)qi C(qi) K(g(qi)  E=n). The
equilibrium output, qEC( E), is characterized by the following rst-order condition:
@ECi
@q
= P 0(nqEC)qEC + P (nqEC)  C 0(qEC) K 0(xEC)g0(qEC) = 0: (5)
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The second-order condition is satised. We obtain xEC( E) = g(qEC( E))  E=n. Dierenti-
ating (5) yields
dqEC
d E
=   @
2ECi =@qi@ E
@2ECi =@qi
2 +
P
j 6=i @
2ECi =@qi@qj
> 0; (6)
where we use @2ECi =@qi@ E = (K
00g0)=n > 0 and @2ECi =@qi
2 +
P
j 6=i @
2ECi =@qi@qj =
P 0   C 00   g00K 0   g02K 00 + n(P 0 + P 00qi) < 0. Similar to the emission intensity case, an
increase in E increases qEC .
3.3 Comparison
In this subsection, we compare the two instruments. As expected, the equilibrium output
is larger under the emission intensity regulation than under the emission cap regulation.
Result 1 qEI( E) > qEC( E).
Proof. See the Appendix.
Result 1 suggests that the equilibrium output under emission intensity regulation is larger
than that under emission cap regulation. This result implies that the emission intensity
regulation yields greater consumer surplus than the emission cap regulation does.
We now present our result on each rm's prot. Let l( E) := li
 
ql( E); (n  1)ql( E)
denote each rm's equilibrium prot, l = EI;EC.
Proposition 1 The emission cap regulation yields higher prot than the emission intensity
regulation does; that is, EC( E) > EI( E).
Proof. See the Appendix.
We explain the intuition behind Result 1 and Proposition 1. Under the emission intensity
regulation, given , an increase in qi increases the upper limit of emissions. Therefore, each
rm has a stronger incentive to increase its output under the emission intensity regulation
than under the emission cap regulation, resulting in the larger equilibrium output (Result 1).
However, anticipating this behavior of each rm, the government sets a stricter regulation
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to meet the emission target E, which reduces the rms' prot.
We now discuss the welfare comparison. The emission intensity regulation is superior
for consumer welfare to the emission cap regulation, but is less protable for the rms.
Thus, it is generally ambiguous which regulation is socially preferable. Let WEI( E) and
WEC( E) be the equilibrium welfare under the emission intensity regulation and emission
cap regulation, respectively. We present two cases in which the emission intensity regulation
yields greater welfare than the emission cap regulation does; that is, WEI( E) > WEC( E).
First, we consider the case with the most stringent target case ( E is close to zero). When
the rms are not allowed to pollute in the process of producing output (i.e., E =  = 0), all
emissions are reduced by the abatement activities and there are no emissions in the industry.
Regardless of output level, the total emissions are zero if and only if the emissions per unit
of output are zero. Therefore, when E = 0, the emission cap regulation and emission
intensity regulation yield the same outcome. Let qZ and xZ be common q and x under the
zero-emission constraint (i.e., when E = 0).
We now present the result when E is close to zero.
Proposition 2 If E is suciently close to zero, the emission intensity regulation yields
greater welfare than the emission cap regulation does.
Proof. See the Appendix.
The intuition behind the result is as follows. As explained after Proposition 1, given
 > 0, each rm has a stronger incentive to expand its output under the emission intensity
regulation than under the emission cap regulation, because under the former regulation,
each rm can increase the upper limit of emissions. However, this problem does not exist
when E =  = 0. Therefore, qEC = qEI and xEC = xEI when E =  = 0.
An increase in  relaxes the restriction on emissions. This leads to an increase in
emissions, resulting in larger disutility from the emissions (emission eect). However, by
the assumption of emission equivalence between two regimes, the emission eect is the same
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for the regimes. An increase in E and  aects the per-rm output, q, and the per-rm
abatement, x, (allocation eect). As stated above, the emission intensity regulation yields
larger q and x than the emission cap regulation does.
Given the emission level, under the emission cap regulation, the marginal social cost of
the reduction of emissions by the reduction of q is P=g0 and that by the increase of x is K 0.
The marginal private cost for meeting the constraint by the reduction of q is (P + P 0q)=g0
and that by the increase of x is K 0. Thus, both x and q chosen by the rms are too small
from the welfare viewpoint. Given the emission level, under emission intensity regulation,
the marginal private cost for meeting the constraint by the reduction of q for each rm is
(P + P 0q)=(g0   ) and that by the increase of x is K 0. When  is small, both x and q
chosen by the rms are still too small from the welfare viewpoint, but both are larger than
under the emission cap regulation. Therefore, the emission intensity regulation is better for
welfare than the emission cap regulation is.
We believe that the most stringent case discussed in Proposition 2 is important. As
mentioned in the introduction, under the Paris climate agreement, many countries, including
the UK, China, France, Germany, and Japan, aim to reduce CO2 emissions drastically by
2050 (about an 80% reduction against a business-as-usual scenario). To achieve this goal,
in several industries, such as electric power and transportation, a severe constraint that is
close to zero emissions might be imposed. Thus, our result in the most stringent case has
important implications for the debate on regulation.
Next, we examine the opposite (loosest constraint) case in which E is close to EB.
Proposition 3 Suppose that E is suciently close to EB. The emission intensity regulation
yields greater welfare than the emission cap regulation does.
Proof. See the Appendix.
We explain the intuition. Because of emission equivalence, the emission eect is the
same between two regimes. When E = EB, qEC = qEI = qB and xEC = xEI = 0. Because
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K 0(0) = 0, this abatement level is too low for welfare, and a marginal reduction of emissions
by an increase in x is much more ecient than that by a reduction in q for welfare. In
other words, given the emission, q is too large and x is too small for welfare. A marginal
decrease in  increases x and reduces q under both the emission cap regulation and emission
intensity regulation, which improves welfare. The magnitude of this eect is stronger under
the emission intensity regulation. Note that qEI > qEC and thus, xEI > xEC for E 2 (0; EB).
In Propositions 2 and 3, we show that when the target level is close to the strictest
and loosest cases, the emission intensity regulation is better for welfare than the emission
cap regulation is. The emission intensity regulation stimulates production and mitigates
the problem of suboptimal production and abatement investment, which improves welfare
under emission equivalence. Because the emission intensity regulation is better for welfare
in the two polar cases, it might be natural to consider that the emission intensity regulation
is better for any E 2 (0; EB). However, this is not true.
Let (x( E); q( E)) be the pair of the second-best abatement and output level (social
optimum x and q given E = E). The derivation is as follows. Let q = [q1; q2; :::; qn] and
x = [x1; x2; :::; xn] denote an output prole and abatement prole, respectively. Given E,
the problem is
max
(q;x)
W =
Z Q
0
P (z)dz  
nX
i=1
(C(qi) K(xi))  ( E)
s:t: E=n = g(qi)  xi:
The second-best output level, q( E), is characterized by the following rst-order condition:
@W
@qi
= P (nq( E))  C 0(q( E)) K 0(x( E))g0(q( E)) = 0 (i = 1; 2; :::; n): (7)
x( E) is derived from E = n (g(q)  x) : Dierentiating (7) yields
dq
d E
=   @
2W (q; :::; q)=@qi@ E
@2W (q; :::; q)=@q2i +
P
j 6=i @
2W (q; :::; q)=@qi@qj
> 0; (8)
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where we use @2W=@qi@ E = (g
0K 00)=n > 0, @2W=@q2i = P
0   C 00   g00K 0   g02K 00 < 0, and
@2W=@qi@qj = P
0 < 0.
As discussed above, qEC( E) < q( E) and thus, xEC( E) < x( E). In the two po-
lar cases (strictest and loosest cases), (xEC( E); qEC( E)) = (xEI( E); qEI( E)): Except for
the two polar cases, (xEC( E); qEC( E)) < (xEI( E); qEI( E)) holds (Result 1). As long as
(xEC( E); qEC( E)) < (xEI( E); qEI( E)) < (x( E); q( E)), the outcome under the emission
intensity regulation is closer to the second-best outcome than that under the emission cap
regulation, and thus, the emission intensity regulation naturally yields greater welfare than
the emission intensity regulation does. However, it is possible that (xEI( E); qEI( E)) >
(x( E); q( E)). Because the emission intensity can yield excessive production and exces-
sive abatement investment, the emission cap regulation might be better than the emission
intensity regulation for welfare.
We present the case wherein the emission cap regulation could be better than the emis-
sion intensity regulation for welfare.
Proposition 4 Suppose that P = a  bQ, C = 0, g = eqi, and K = kx2i =2. Then,
WEI > (<)WEC if k < (>)~k;
where ~k :=
b

2e2   e(n+ 2) + 2(n+ 2) p4e4 + 4e3n+ 2e2 (n2 + 4)  23e(n+ 2)2 + 4(n+ 2)2
2e2(e  ) ;
lim E!0 ~k = lim E!EB ~k = 1, ~k is U-shaped with respect to E, and ~k  k := (b(6   n) +
b
p
68 + 20n+ n2)=2e2 for any E 2 (0; EB).
Proof See the Appendix.
Figure 1 shows this result graphically (the case in which a = 5, b = 1, k = 3, e = 2, and
n = 3). If k is not large, the emission intensity regulation yields greater welfare regardless
of E. However, if k is larger at a certain level, the emission cap regulation yields greater
welfare at some target level.
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Figure 1: Welfare Comparison
As discussed above, the excessive production and abatement under the emission intensity
regulation are the key factors behind Proposition 4. Figure 2 shows that x can be smaller
than xEI , although x is always larger than xEI regardless of E (the case in which a = 5,
b = 1, k = 3, e = 2, and n = 3). In other words, the abatement level under the emission
intensity regulation can be too large (and the output level is also too large) to achieve the
target level of emissions.
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Figure 2: Abatement Level Comparison
We summarize the properties of the equilibrium abatement in the following. From Figure
2, we observe that x and xEC are decreasing in E. This is intuitive. A stricter regulation
(smaller E) stimulates emission abatement. By contrast, Figure 2 suggests that xEI can be
increasing in E. This is because an increase in E relaxes the emission constraint, thereby
naturally reducing abatement. However, an increase in E enlarges the output, which leads
to the large abatement. Because the output expansion eect is strong under the emission
intensity constraint, the latter eect might dominate the former eect, and thus, xEI can
be increasing in E.
Under the general conditions, this discussion can be reduced to the following proposition.
Proposition 5 (i) x and xEC are decreasing in E. (ii) xEI is decreasing in E if E is
suciently close to EB. (iii) xEI is nonmonotone with respect to E if g0K 0 >  qZ(P 0  
C 00   g00K 0 + n(P 0 + P 00qZ)).
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Proof See the Appendix.
Proposition 5 suggests that the eect of emission regulation on the abatement activity
depends on the regulatory regimes. With regard to Proposition 5(iii), it is dicult to judge
under which conditions this inequality is satised. Here, we again specify the model as we
did in Proposition 4 and derive the conditions.
Proposition 6 Suppose that P = a   bQ, C = 0, g = eqi, and K = kx2i =2. Then, xEI is
nonmonotone with respect to E if ke2 > (n+ 1)b and decreasing in E otherwise.
Proof See the Appendix.
When e is larger, an increase in q increases the emission level more. An increase in E
substantially increases the output under the emission intensity regulation, which induces
larger abatement to oset the increase in emissions. The output expansion eect is stronger
when b or n is smaller. Specically, if the demand is elastic or the number of rms is small,
a rm's output is more sensitive to a change in the emission regulation. Therefore, an
increase in E more likely increases x when b or n are smaller. When k is larger, an increase
in E reduces the marginal cost of production, including the emission abatement cost, more
signicantly, and thus, an increase in E more signicantly increases the output. Therefore,
an increase in E more likely increases x when k is larger.
4 Dierentiated Bertrand competition
In this section, we consider dierentiated Bertrand competition instead of Cournot com-
petition, meaning that rms compete in strategic complements. We show that our main
results do not depend on the mode of competition.
Assume that there are n symmetric rms that produce dierentiated products. The di-
rect demand function for product i (i = 1; 2; :::; n) is given by Di(p1; p2; :::; pn) : R+ 7! R+.
We assume that D is twice continuously dierentiable for all pi > 0. The demand is
14
downward sloping, @Di=@pi < 0; and @Di=@pj > 0; j 6= i as long as D > 0. The
latter condition means that goods are substitutes. In addition, we assume that the di-
rect eect of a price change dominates the indirect eect,
Pn
m=1 (@Di=@pm) < 0 and
@2Di=(@pi)
2 +
P
j 6=i j@2Di=@pi@pjj < 0. We further assume that demand has increasing
dierences, @2Di=@pi@pj  0; which implies that the price-setting game is supermodular.
These are standard assumptions in a price-setting oligopoly with dierentiated products.7
Except for the demand system, we follow the same structure in the quantity competition
analysis. The rm i0s prot is i = piDi(pi; p i)  C(Di(pi; p i)) K(xi).
4.1 Emission Intensity regulation
Dene the prot function of rm i under the emission intensity regulation as EIi (pi; p i) :=
piDi(pi; p i)  C(Di(pi; p i)) K(g(Di)  Di). The rst-order condition is
@EIi
@pi
= Di(pi; p i) + (pi   C 0  K 0(g0   )) @Di
@pi
= 0 (i = 1; 2; :::; n):
Focusing on the symmetric equilibrium (pi = p
EI() for i) under the emission intensity
regulation,
@EIi (p
EI ; :::; pEI)
@pi
= DEI +
 
pEI   C 0  K 0(g0   ) @Di
@pi
= 0; (9)
where DEI() = Di
 
pEI(); :::; pEI()

and xEI() = g
 
DEI()
   DEI(). Using the
implicit function theorem and dierentiating (9) with respect to  yields
@DEI
@
+

@pEI
@
  C 00@D
EI
@
 K 00@x
EI
@
(g0   ) K 0

g00
@DEI
@
  1

@Di
@pi
+
 
pEI   C 0  K 0(g0   ) nX
m=1
@2Di
@pi@pm
@pEI
@
= 0
7Examples of the demand system include linear and constant elasticity of substitution demand and the
logit demand model (see Vives, 1999; Anderson et al., 2001).
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where
@DEI
@
=
nX
m=1
@Di
@pm
@pEI
@
;
@xEI
@
= (g0   )@D
EI
@
 DEI :
Hence, using the assumptions for demand functions,
@pEI
@
=
  (K
0 +K 00(g0   )DEI)@Di
@pi
@Di
@pi
+

1   C 00  K 00 (g0   )2  K 0g00 @Di
@pi
P
m
@Di
@pm
+ (pEI   C 0  K 0(g0   ))Pm @2Di@pi@pm
< 0;
implying that
@DEI
@
> 0: (10)
As well as the Cournot model, an increase in  relaxes the emission constraint and increases
the per-rm output, DEI().
We compare the equilibrium outcomes under emission equivalence. We redene the
equilibrium outcomes, satisfying nDEI(b) = bE, as pEI( bE) := pEI(b). Let (DEI( bE); xEI( bE))
be the pair of equilibrium output and abatement and WEI( bE) be the equilibrium welfare
under the emission intensity regulation when  = b:
4.2 Emission Cap Regulation
If the rms are subject to the emission cap, the prot function of rm i under the emission
cap regulation can be written as ECi (pi; p i) := piDi(pi; p i) C(Di(pi; p i)) K(g(Di) bE=n). Given the emission cap, bE=n, the rst-order condition is
@ECi
@pi
= Di(pi; p i) + pi
@Di
@pi
  C 0@Di
@pi
 K 0g0@Di
@pi
= 0 (i = 1; 2; :::; n):
Focusing on the symmetric equilibrium (pi = p
EC( bE) for all i),
@ECi (p
EC ; :::; pEC)
@pi
= DEC + pEC
@Di
@pi
  C 0@Di
@pi
 K 0g0@Di
@pi
= 0; (11)
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where DEC( bE) = Di(pEC( bE); :::; pEC( bE)). Using the implicit function theorem and dier-
entiating (11) with respect to bE yields
@DEC
@ bE +

@pEC
@ bE   C 00@D
EC
@ bE  K 00@x
EC
@ bE g0  K 0g00@D
EC
@ bE

@Di
@pi
+
 
pEC   C 0  K 0g0 nX
m=1
@2Di
@pi@pm
@pEC
@ bE = 0
where
@DEC
@ bE =
nX
m=1
@Di
@pm
@pEC
@ bE
@xEC
@ bE = g0@D
EC
@ bE   1n:
Hence, we obtain
@pEC
@ bE =
  K
00g0 @Di
@pi
1
n
@Di
@pi
+

1  (C 00  K 00g02  K 0g00) @Di
@pi
P
m
@Di
@pm
+ (pEI   C 0  K 0g0)Pm @2Di@pi@pm < 0:
This also implies
@DEC
@ bE > 0: (12)
As in the case of emission intensity, the eect of the emission regulation on the per-rm
output is the same as that under Cournot competition.
4.3 Comparison
We now compare equilibrium outcomes under two dierent regimes and reexamine Result
1 and Propositions 1{3. Under the regularity condition, the equilibrium output is larger
under the emission intensity regulation than under the emission cap regulation.
Result 1B DEI( bE) > DEC( bE).
The proof is straightforward from (9), (11), and
Pn
m=1 (@Di=@pm) < 0. Using (9) and (11),
we obtain pEI( bE) < pEC( bE). Because of the demand condition, we obtain this result.
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Next, we present our result on the rm's prot. Let l( bE) := li(pl( bE); pl( bE)) denote
each rm's equilibrium prot under emission equivalence, l = EI;EC.
Proposition 1B The emission cap regulation yields higher prot than does the emission
intensity regulation; that is, EC( bE) > EI( bE).
Proof. See the Appendix.
We now compare the resulting social welfare under both regulations. Let
W (pi; p i) := U(Di(pi; p i); D i(pi; p i)) 
nX
i=1
(Ci(Di(pi; p i)) +Ki(xi))  (E)
denote total social surplus under price competition. Denote the equilibrium welfare under
emission equivalence by W l( bE) := W l(pl( bE); pl( bE)), l = EI;EC. We consider the most
stringent regulation, which imposes a near-zero emission.
Proposition 2B If bE is suciently close to zero, the emission intensity regulation yields
greater welfare than the emission cap regulation does.
Proof. See the Appendix.
Likewise, we consider the opposite case when bE is close to EB. We omit the proof be-
cause it is analogous to that of Proposition 2B.8
Proposition 3B Suppose that bE is suciently close to EB. The emission intensity regu-
lation yields greater welfare than the emission cap regulation does.
Provided that rms compete in strategic complements instead of strategic substitutes,
our main results hold, that is, the emission intensity regulation leads to higher welfare in the
extreme cases. This has important policy implications. The model that covers both quantity
and dierentiated Bertrand competition can be applicable across diverse industries, such as
the energy, semiconductor, electric, and transportation industries. Thus, regulators should
take into account the emission intensity regulation as an ecient regulatory instrument.
8The proof is available upon request from the authors.
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5 Concluding Remarks
In this study, we compare two direct-regulation tools, an emission cap regulation and an
emission intensity regulation. We nd that prot-maximizing rms always prefer the emis-
sion cap regulation. However, the emission intensity regulation always yields greater con-
sumer welfare and can yield greater welfare. Moreover, we present two cases in which the
emission intensity regulation yields greater welfare than the emission cap regulation does:
the case of the strictest target, which is close to a zero-emission target, and the case of the
loosest target, which is close to business as usual. Our result suggests that the government
should adopt the emission intensity regulation, especially to achieve a zero-emission society
eciently.
Our study neglects any uncertainty of demand or cost. If the government chooses the
direct regulation before knowing the demand parameter, an increase of the degree of demand
uncertainty increases the advantage of the emission intensity regulation over the emission
cap regulation for both the welfare and prots of rms. This is because the rms can expand
(shrink) their output more exibly under the emission intensity regulation than under the
emission cap regulation when demand is high (low). We consider this is the reason that some
companies, such as Japanese electric power companies, choose emission intensity regulations
as their favored form of self-regulation. Comparing the two tools after introducing demand
uncertainty is left to future research.
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Appendix
Proof of Result 1
@ECi
@qi

qi=qEI
= K 0(xEI)
 
g0(qEI)   K 0(xEI)g0(qEI) < 0:
This inequality implies that qEIi is excessive from rm i's prot-maximizing viewpoint under
the price cap regulation. 
Proof of Proposition 1
Using the resulting prot and emission equivalence, we obtain
EC( E) = P (nqEC)qEC   C(qEC) K(g(qEC)  E=n)
> P (nqEI)qEI   C(qEI) K(g(qEI)  E=n)
= P (nqEI)qEI   C(qEI) K(g(qEI)  qEI) = EI( E);
where the inequality follows from the fact that qEC( E) = argmaxfqig P (Q)qi   C(qi)  
K(g(qi)  E=n) and qEI 6= qEC : 
Proof of Proposition 2
For l = EC;EI, we obtain
dW l
d E

E=0
=
nX
i=1

@W l
@qi
dql
d E
+
@W l
@xi
dxl
d E

+
@W l
@ E
= n(P (nqZ)  C 0(qZ))dq
l
d E
  nK 0(xZ)dx
l
d E
  0(0)
= n(P (nqZ)  C 0(qZ))dq
l
d E
  nK 0(xZ)

g0(qZ)
dql
d E
  1
n

  0(0)
= n(P (nqZ)  C 0(qZ) K 0(xZ)g0(qZ))dq
l
d E
+K 0(xZ)  0(0);
where we use g(qi)   xi = E=n (and thus, dxl=d E = g0(dql=d E)   1=n), and (qEC ; xEC) =
(qEI ; xEI) = (qZ ; xZ) when E = 0. Because qZ < qEC < qEI for all E > 0, we obtain
dqEI
d E

E=0
>
dqEC
d E

E=0
> 0:
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From (5), we obtain P  C 0 K 0g0 > P +P 0qi C 0 K 0g0 = 0. Under these conditions, we
obtain
dWEI
d E

E=0
>
dWEC
d E

E=0
> 0:
Because WEI = WEC when E = 0, we obtain Proposition 2. 
Proof of Proposition 3
For l = EC;EI, we obtain
@W l
@ E

E=EB
=
nX
i=1

@W l
@qi
dql
d E
+
@W l
@xi
dxl
d E

= n(P (nqB)  C 0(qB))dq
l
d E
  nK 0(xB)dx
l
d E
  0(EB)
= n(P (nqB)  C 0(qB))dq
l
d E
  0;
where we use qEC = qEI = qB and xEC = xEI = 0 when E = EB and K 0(0) = 0: Because
qEC < qEI < qB for all E < EB, we obtain
0 <
dqEI
d E

E=EB
<
dqEC
d E

E=EB
:
From (5), we obtain P   C 0 > 0. Under these conditions,
@WEI
@ E

E=EB
<
@WEC
@ E

E=EB
< 0:
Because WEI = WEC when E = EB, we obtain Proposition 3. 
Proof of Proposition 4
First, we consider the equilibrium outputs for each regime. From (3) and (5), we obtain
qEI =
a
(1 + n)b+ k(e  )2 ; q
EC =
a+ ke E
(1 + n)b+ e2k
:
Substituting the equilibrium outputs into total surplus, we obtain
WEI() =
an (a (b(n+ 2) + k(e  )2)  2 (b(n+ 1) + k(e  )2))
2 (b(n+ 1) + k(e  )2)2 ;
WEC( E) =
a2n2 (b(n+ 2) + e2k) + 2aekn E (b(n+ 2) + e2k)  bk E2 (b(n+ 1)2 + e2kn)
2n (bn+ b+ e2k)2
   E:
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Using EEI() = qEI = E, WEC( E) can be rewritten as a function of . Thus, we obtain
WEI() WEC( E) = a
2kn(e  )H
2 (bn+ b+ e2k)2 (b(n+ 1) + k(e  )2)2 ;
where H := 2b2(n+1)+bk (2e2   e(n+ 2) + (n+ 2)2)+e2k2( e). WEI() WEC( E)
is positive if and only if H > 0 and
H > (<)0 if k < (>)~k;
where ~k :=
b

2e2   e(n+ 2) + 2(n+ 2) p4e4 + 4e3n+ 2e2 (n2 + 4)  23e(n+ 2)2 + 4(n+ 2)2
2e2(e  ) :
Remember that  is determined by EEI() = E, and thus, ~k also depends on the emission
target via . This implies that WEI() > (<)WEC( E) if k < (>)~k. Because lim!0 ~k =
lim!e ~k =1, we obtain lim E!0 ~k = lim E!EB ~k =1.
Dierentiating ~k with , we obtain
@~k
@ 
=
b(e  2)

2e2 + en  2n p4e4 + 4bare3n+ 2e2 (n2 + 4)  23e(n+ 2)2 + 4(n+ 2)2
2(e  )2p4e4 + 4e3n+ 2e2 (n2 + 4)  23e(n+ 2)2 + 4(n+ 2)2 :
Because @~k=@  is negative (positive) when  < (>) e=2, ~k( E) is U-shaped and mini-
mized at  = e=2. Because ~k is minimized when  = e=2, we obtain k = b(6   n +
p
n2 + 20n+ 68)=2e2. Note that ( E) is increasing, (0) = 0; and (EB) = e. 
Proof of Proposition 5
(i) For l = EC;EI, and , we have
dxl
d E
= g0
dql
d E
  1
n
;
where we use g   x = E. Combining the equation with (8), we obtain
dx
d E
= g0

  (g
0K 00)=n
nP 0 + P 00q   C 00   g00K 0   g02K 00

  1
n
=
1
n

  g
02K 00
nP 0   C 00   g00K 0   g02K 00   1

< 0:
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Likewise, from (6), we obtain
dxEC
d E
= g0

  (K
00g0)=n
P 0   C 00   g00K 0   g02K 00 + n(P 0 + P 00qi)

  1
n
=
1
n

  g
02K 00
P 0   C 00   g00K 0   g02K 00 + n(P 0 + P 00qi)   1

< 0:
Therefore, x and xEC are decreasing in E in general demand and cost functions.
(ii) From (4), we obtain
dxEI
d E
= g0
dqEI
d
d
d E
  1
n
= g0
dqEI
d
1
n

qEI + 
dqEI
d
 1
  1
n
;
=
1
n
 
g0
dqEI
d

qEI + 
dqEI
d
 1
  1
!
;
where we use E=n = qEI() when E > 0. Thus,
dxEI
d E
> (<)0 if and only if   (g0   )dq
EI
d
  qEI > (<)0:
If E = EB, we obtain


E=EB
= (g0   ) dq
EI
d
  qB
= (g0   )

  (g
0   )K 00qB
P 0   C 00   g00K 0   (g0   )2K 00 + n(P 0 + P 00qi)

  qB
= qB

  (g
0   )2K 00
P 0   C 00   g00K 0   (g0   )2K 00 + n(P 0 + P 00qi)   1

< 0;
where we use qEI = qB; xEI = 0, and K 0(0) = 0 when E = EB. Thus, xEI is decreasing in
E if E is suciently close to EB.
(iii) If E = 0, we obtain


E=0
= g0
dqEI
d
  qZ
= g0

  K
0 + g0K 00qZ
P 0   C 00   g00K 0   g02K 00 + n(P 0 + P 00qZ)

  qZ ;
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where we use qEI = qZ ,  = 0 when E = 0. Thus, we nd


E=0
> (<)0 if and only if g0K 0 > (<)  qZ  P 0   C 00   g00K 0 + n(P 0 + P 00qZ) : (13)

Proof of Proposition 6
From (13), we obtain
dxEI
d E

E=0
> (<)0 if and only if ke2 > (<)(n+ 1)b:
This and Proposition 5(ii) imply that xEI is nonmonotone with respect to E if ke2 > (n+1)b.
Suppose that ke2  (n + 1)b: We show that xEI is decreasing in E, which is the latter
part of Proposition 6. Remember that  is the key determinant of dxEI=d E. Under the
specic model, we obtain
 = (g0   )dq
EI
d
  qEI = (e  ) 2ak(e  )
((n+ 1)b+ k(e  )2)2  
a
(n+ 1)b+ k(e  )2
=
a(k(e  )2   (n+ 1)b)
((n+ 1)b+ k(e  )2)2 < 0: 
Proof of Proposition 1B
Using the resulting prot and emission equivalence, we obtain
EC( bE) = pECDEC   C(DEC) K(g(DEC)  bE=n)
> pEIDEI   C(DEI) K(g(DEI)  bE=n)
= pEIDEI   C(DEI) K(g(DEI)  DEI) = EI( bE);
where the inequality follows from the fact that pEC( bE) = argmaxfpig piDi(pi; p i) C(Di(pi; p i)) 
K(g(Di)  bE=n) and pEI 6= pEC . 
Proof of Proposition 2B
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For l = EC;EI, we obtain
dW l
d bE
 bE=0 =
nX
i=1
@W
@Di
@Dl
@ bE +
nX
i=1
@W
@xi
@xl
@ bE + @W@ bE
=
X
i
(
@U
@Di
  C 0(DZ))@D
k
@ bE   nK 0(xZ)@x
k
@ bE   0(0)
= n(pZ   C 0(DZ))@D
k
@ bE   nK 0(xZ)

g0(DZ)
@Dk
@ bE   1n

  0(0)
= n
 
pZ   C 0(DZ) K 0(xZ)g0(DZ) @Dk
@ bE +K 0(xZ)  0(0):
Because DZ < DEC < DEI for all bE > 0 and the equilibrium demand is monotonically
increasing from (10) and (12), we obtain
@DEI
d bE
 bE=0> @DECd bE
 bE=0:
We obtain
dWEI
d bE
 bE=0> dWECd bE
 bE=0:
Because WEI = WEC when bE = 0, we obtain Proposition 2B. 
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